Post-quantum signatures

Why Qanum signs with ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, and what that costs in bytes and time.

Most digital money today is protected by elliptic-curve signatures. A large enough quantum computer running Shor's algorithm could derive a private key from its public key and spend the coins. Qanum uses only signatures standardized by NIST for that scenario, at the highest security level, from its first block.

Classical and post-quantum, side by side

ECDSA (secp256k1) Ed25519 ML-DSA-87 (Qanum, everyday spends) SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s (Qanum, recovery)
Based onElliptic curvesElliptic curvesLatticesHash functions
Broken by Shor's algorithmYesYesNo efficient quantum attack knownNo efficient quantum attack known
StandardSEC 2 (curve)RFC 8032NIST FIPS 204NIST FIPS 205
NIST post-quantum security levelNot applicableNot applicable5 (highest)5 (highest)
Public key33 bytes32 bytes2,592 bytes64 bytes
Signature64 to 72 bytes64 bytes4,627 bytes29,792 bytes
Verify one signature, x86-64 serverNot measuredNot measuredabout 55 µsabout 1.2 ms
Verify one signature, ARMNot measuredNot measuredabout 167 µsabout 1.9 ms

Sizes of the Qanum suites: whitepaper §6.2. Times: one core, medians from the published runs on x86-64 and ARM, with raw data. Classical signatures were not measured in Qanum.

What it costs

What it does not change: mining

Post-quantum signatures protect spending. They do not protect mining. Qanum's proof of work uses SHA3-256, and Grover's algorithm gives a quantum computer a quadratic speed-up on any hash-based proof of work, whatever the hash. Published estimates put that advantage far below current mining hardware for years, and the difficulty adjustment absorbs it. Qanum does not claim that its proof of work is quantum-resistant (whitepaper §9.9).

Learn more